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Article 3

Ip: Responses to the Ten Questions

RESPONSES TO THE TEN QUESTIONS
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Historical comparisons, particularly of the negative variety, are
hazardous. Was slavery worse than the Holocaust? Was the
colonization of Native Americans worse than slavery? How does the
Holocaust compare with the colonization of Native Americans?
The correct answers are not self-evident: reasonable minds might
well differ.
The question posed here presents a similar
conundrum. On the one hand, there is wholesale removal and
internment of Japanese aliens and Japanese-Americans some
seventy years ago ("the internment"), which is now widely regarded
as a shameful chapter in American history.' On the other hand,
there is the very recent history-indeed it is perhaps premature to
Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand.
t
1. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9 AsIAN
L.j. 195 (2002); Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of
History, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 571 (2002) [hereinafter Lessons of Histoiy].
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call it history-of the excesses of the Bush administration's War on
Terror.
If historical comparisons are so vexed, then why attempt them?
In this particular instance, the reason is that the historical parallels
between the two episodes are hard to ignore. The internment
followed the attack on Pearl Harbor, which signaled the entry of
the United States into World War II. President Bush declared the
beginning of the War on Terror shortly after the terrorist attacks of
9/11. In short, both the internment and the various policies
constituting the War on Terror were responses that followed
moments of crisis in American national security.
Thus, when considering the question of what responses were
appropriate in responding to the threat of terrorist attacks after
9/11, the internment loomed as an obvious historical precedentor warning, depending on one's point of view. This comes through
in much of the academic legal writing on the topics of terrorism
and national security since 9/11.2 The discussion in the academic
literature was paralleled by a rekindling of popular debate over the
internment, which by this time lay discredited as an irrational
wartime overreaction. Two notable examples of this are U.S.
Representative Howard Coble's 2003 comments justifying the
internment and the publication
4 of conservative pundit Michelle
Malkin's In Defense of Internment.
More importantly, the internment's historical resonance in the
post-9/11 age was not lost on former internees and their families.
Fred Korematsu, the most famous of the Japanese-Americans to
launch legal challenges to aspects of the internment, filed amicus
briefs in support of terrorist suspects indefinitely detained without
trial by the United States. 5 Similarly, Fred Korematsu's daughter,
along with the children of internee litigants Minoru Yasui and
Gordon Hirabayashi, filed an amicus brief in relation to litigation
concerning the treatment of Muslim non-citizens rounded up and

2.

See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Inference or Impact? Racial Profiling and the

Internment's True Legacy, 1 OHIO ST. J. lRIM. L. 103, 106-07 (2003) [hereinafter
Inference or Impact] and sources cited therein.
3. Christopher Marquis, Threats and Responses: Detention; Lawmaker Says
Interning US.JapaneseWas Proper,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,2003, at A23.
4. MICHELLE MALIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR "RACIAL
PROFILING" IN WORLD WAR II AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004).

5. Matt Bai, The Lives They Lived, He Said No to Internmen4 N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
2005, at 6.
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detained in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
There is a further historical thread that connects the
internment to the War on Terror. Durinf the Cold War, Congress
enacted the Internal Security Act of 1950 over President Truman's
veto. Title II of the Act, known as the Emergency Detention Act of
1950,8 drew its inspiration from the internment. The Emergency
Detention Act authorized the President to declare an internal
security emergency in certain exigent circumstances and to then
have persons suspected of being security risks detained in
internment camps. Several camps were prepared for this very
purpose, including Tule Lake internment camp, which had held
Japanese-American internees as late as 1946. Japanese-Americans,
acutely aware of the potential danger the Emergency Detention Act
posed, played an integral role in its eventual repeal.9 In 1971, the
Act was not only repealed but replaced by the Non-Detention Act,
which stipulates that no citizen is to be detained absent the
authorization from an act of Congress.'1 The Non-Detention Act of
course would be central to the dispute over the legality of the
detention of citizen enemy combatants after 9/11.
So, despite the limitations and pitfalls, there is value in
comparing the internment with measures taken by the Bush
administration in the name of the War on Terror. But before
making that comparison, let me first sketch out in greater detail
what is being compared.

II. WHAT ARE WE COMPARING?
A.

The Internment

The basic facts of the internment are not in serious dispute.
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order
6. Nina Bernstein, Echoes of '40s Internment Are Seen in Muslim Detainees' Suit
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at B1.
7. Pub. L. No. 81-831, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
8. Pub. L. No. 831, tit. II, § 101(6), 64 Stat. 1019-20 (1950).
9. Roger Daniels, The JapaneseAmerican Cases, 1942-2004: A Social History, 68
LAw& CONTEMp. PROBS. 159, 165-66 (2005).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006).
11. This account is based on COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND
INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUsTIcE DENIED 1-16 (1982) [hereinafter
PERSONALJUSTICE DENIED] and GREG ROBINSON, A TRAGEDY OF DEMOCRACY 92-132
(2009).
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9066. 1 This now infamous order granted the Secretary of War and
his military commanders the ability to create military zones, from
which people could be excluded at the discretion of the military.
Although not apparent from the text, the order was intended to
authorize the removal of all Japanese persons living on the West
Coast, a group that included both migrants from Japan (Issei) and
first generation native-born citizens (Nisei).
In March of 1942, General John DeWitt, the commander of
the Western Defense Command, announced the creation of the
military zones. On March 21, Congress obligingly enacted a law
making it an offense to "enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act
in any military area or military zone... contrary to the restrictions
applicable to any such area or zone or contrary to the
order of the
3
Secretary of War or any such military commander.'
With the legal framework in place, the Issei and Nisei were first
subject to restrictions on their movement. This was followed by the
removal of the Issei and Nisei from their homes on the West Coast
to assembly centers. DeWitt's orders to remove all Japanese from
the West Coast were carried out literally, and went to the extent of
removing those with as little as one-sixteenth Japanese blood, and
removingJapanese children from non-Japanese foster parents.14
From mid-1942, 110,000 Issei and Nisei were moved to
euphemistically-named "relocation centers" located in remote
areas of the United States. Most spent on average just under twoand-one-half years interned in the ten relocation centers,
surrounded by barbed wire and armed sentries. For some who
passed a loyalty test, there was eventually the possibility of parole
under certain conditions. 5
In a series of judicial decisions, the most infamous being
Korematsu,16 the Supreme Court largely turned a blind eye as a
brave few challenged various stages of the internment, accepting
instead the Government's assertion of military necessity.
Subsequently, after more than forty years and the dogged efforts of
many, the U.S. Government would apologize for the internment,

12.
13.

Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
Act of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (1942).

14.

ROBINsoN,

supra note 11, at 126.

15. PERSONALJUSTICE DENIED, supranote 11, at 12-13.
16. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The other Supreme
Court cases were: Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) and ExparteEndo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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and pay $20,000 to each surviving internee.

7

B. Abuses of Civil Liberties in the Bush Administration'sWar on Terror
It might be thought that for a foreign legal academic and
periodic watcher of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, there
would be too much to choose from here. But given the difficulties
of making historical comparisons identified earlier, I am excluding
perhaps otherwise obvious candidates for discussion such as the
USA PATRIOT Act and the Bush administration's Terrorist
Surveillance Program, and limiting myself to racial profiling and
the detention of terrorist suspects-two aspects of the Bush
administration's War on Terror that can in my view sensibly be
compared to the internment. I elaborate further on both of these
counterterrorism measures below, while of course acknowledging
that not all will necessarily agree with my characterization of any of
these measures as amounting to abuses of civil liberties.
Racial profiling denotes the use of race, ethnicity, or color as a
reason for singling a person out for some form of additional
scrutiny or investigation. Prior to 2001, discussion about this
subject in the United States focused on the stopping and searching
of disproportionate numbers of African-American drivers by law
enforcement officers, giving rise to the term DWB, or "driving
while black." By 9/11, there was virtually a consensus that racial
profiling was wrong. However, this consensus promptly evaporated
after the 9/11 attacks; there were immediate calls-and widespread
public support-for the racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims at
airports. Indeed, at the time, stories of airlines removing middleeastern looking men from flights, sometimes at the demand of
other passengers, were legion.
Additionally, the Bush administration implemented other
measures that could be classed as forms of racial profiling. These
include the post-9/11 sweep and subsequent detention of
hundreds of non-citizens, the selection of 8,000 men from Arab
and Muslim countries for voluntary investigative interviews, and the
establishment of a special registration program for visitors to the
United States who happened to be males from a list of mainly Arab

17. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 1, 102 Stat. 903, 905-06
(1988).
18. Inference orImpact, supra note 2, at 104.
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and Muslim states.19

The internment obviously speaks to the issue of racial
profiling. In the same way that an Arab/Muslim background
(assuming that this can be discerned accurately from a person's
appearance) is used as a predictor for increased dangerousness as a
potential terrorist, Japanese ethnicity was used as a predictor for
increased dangerousness as a potential fifth columnist.
As for the detention of terrorists, it bears noting that the Bush
administration's policy of detaining terrorist suspects outside the
criminal justice process had several different facets. In addition to
those detained in the round up of mainly Arab and Muslim noncitizens in early days after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration
detained several hundred persons as "enemy combatants" at
various locales around the world, including Guantanamo Naval
Base, Cuba. The detainees that were considered the most valuable,
including the alleged plotters of the 9/11 attacks, were held for
several years at CIA prisons (known as black sites) spread
throughout the world.2
Among those detained by the Bush administration were two
American citizens. Yaser Hamdi was captured in November 2001 in
Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, which turned him over to
American forces. Initially detained at Guantanamo, Hamdi was
later held as an enemy combatant at naval brigs in Virginia and
South Carolina. Litigation begun on his behalf reached the
Supreme Court, which held that the Authorization of Use of
Military Force, passed by Congress shortly after September 11,
2001, impliedly authorized the detention of persons such as
Hamdi, but that he had to be afforded greater opportunity to
contest the facts underlying his detention. In Hamdi's case, this
never occurred, as the Government negotiated a deal with him
whereby he was freed and sent to Saudi Arabia.
Jose Padilla was arrested by FBI agents at Chicago's O'Hare
Airport in May 2002. Initially detained as a material witness, Padilla
was subsequently designated an enemy combatant and transferred
to military custody. The allegation at the time was that Padilla was
part of a plot to launch a radiological "dirty bomb" attack on
targets within the United States. Padilla's lawyer, who had been
19. Id. at 121-24.
20. See gmerally JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE (2008) (detailing the U.S.
Government's post-9/11 pursuit of terrorists).
21. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519, 538 (2004).
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appointed to represent him in the earlier court proceedings, filed a
writ of habeas corpus on his behalf. This began a long period of
litigation that included one trip to the Supreme Court. Shortly
before his case was to be heard by the Supreme Court for a second
time, the Bush administration transferred Padilla to federal court,
where he was later convicted of participation in a conspiracy
unrelated to the earlier allegations.
The internment entailed the detention of 110,000 Japanese in
the United States, including some 70,000 American citizens in the
form of the Nisei, ostensibly for reasons of national security.
Consequently, it has an obvious relevance to the contemporary
issue of detaining terrorist suspects, whether citizen or non-citizen.
III. POINTS OF COMPARISON

Having outlined what is being compared, I riow discuss three
points of comparison that help address the question of whether the
internment was worse than the excesses of the Bush
administration's War on Terror from a civil liberties standpoint.
The first considers what triggered the state action in question,
whether that be detention or extra security checks at the airport.
The second considers the scope of the action, both in terms of its
duration and how many people it affected. The third looks at the
treatment of those detained.
A.

Trgger

The internment was justified on the grounds of military
necessity. This is captured in a passage ofJustice Black's opinion in
the Korematsu case:
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area
because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded
because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, because
the properly constituted military authorities feared an
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation demanded that all
citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing
its confidence in this time of war in our military leadersas inevitably it must-determined that they should have
22.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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the power to do just this. There was evidence of disloyalty
on the part of some, the military authorities considered
that the need for action was great, and time was short. We
cannot-by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of
say that at that time these actions were
hindsight-now
3
unjustified.1
The claim of military necessity was in fact spurious.
Government individuals and agencies who had examined the
loyalty of Japanese-Americans-John Franklin Carter on behalf of
President Roosevelt, Commander Kenneth Ringle of the Office of
Naval Intelligence, and the FBI--concluded that the claims of
disloyalty had no basis in fact. 24 But DeWitt continued to allege
otherwise all the same. A related canard aboutJapanese-Americans
circulating at the time was that they were involved in sabotage.
Although both the military and the FBI concluded that there had
been no cases of sabotage by Japanese-Americans either during the
Pearl Harbor attack or in the month after on the West Coast, the
of sabotage by Japanese continued to exhibit a life of their
rumors
25
own.
No doubt part of the explanation can be found in the
pervasive fear of invasion, which is also alluded to injustice Black's
opinion. But the fear of invasion was also blown out of proportion.
The military knew that there was no prospect of ajapanese invasion
on the West Coast and had briefed legislators about this prior to
On
President Roosevelt's issuing of Executive Order 9066.
February 3, 1942, General Mark Clark of the Army's General Staff,
who had just returned from an inspection of the West Coast, and
Admiral Harold Stark, chief of naval operations, attended an
informal meeting with the House-Senate Committee on Defense of
Both testified that the Japanese offensive
the West Coast.
capabilities amounted to launching sporadic attacks from
submarines or small ineffectual raids. There was no prospect of
26
invasion. Japanese attacks around the West Coast during this time
were in fact minimal and inconsequential, consisting of the
occasional submarine attack on shipping off the Californian coast
and the shelling of an oil refinery by a submarine in February
23. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944).
24. ROBINSON, supranote 11, at 54-56.

25. Id. at 80.
26. Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi:The Biggest Lie of the Greatest Generation 39-43
(Univ. of N.C. Legal Studies Research Paper, Paper No. 1233682, 2008), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1233682.
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Even if, contrary to the views expressed by General Clark and
Admiral Stark, there had been a serious military threat to the West
Coast, this still would not justify the internment. This is because
the course of the war in the Pacific theater had turned decisively in
favor of the United States after the Battle of Midway (June 4-7,
1942)-a point recognized by contemporary newspaper reports,
including those on the West Coast. At this time, most of the Issei
and Nisei internees had yet to be moved to the relocation camps:
they were either still in their homes or at assembly centers relatively
close to their homes. It was not until six to twelve weeks after the
Battle of Midway 2that
the majority of internees were moved to
relocation camps.
The justification based on military necessity therefore does not
withstand scrutiny. The supposed link between the (enemy)
Japanese Empire and the Issei and Nisei, as well as the supposed
military threat posed to the West Coast by the Japanese Empire,
lack a factual foundation and provide no reasonable justification
for the internment.
What helps explain (but plainly not justify) the internment is
racial prejudice on the part of DeWitt, other key actors, and society
at large. The internment took place in the context of a long
history of racism against Asian migrants. Fear of the yellow peril
manifested itself in laws barring Asian migrants from naturalization
and land-ownership.
After World War I, nativist groups in
California campaigned for the exclusion of all Japanese migrants,
while media demagogues sowed the seeds of the myth of the
divided loyalty of Japanese-Americans in the public mind. It is no
surprise that nativist groups and agricultural groups, whose
members resented the economic success of the West Coast
Japanese and stood to gain from their expulsion, were 3 major
advocates for the removal of the Japanese after Pearl Harbor. 0
General DeWitt's decision to order the exclusion of the Issei
and Nisei from the West Coast was also based on racial prejudice.
In a recommendation to the Secretary of War, DeWitt stated, "The
Japanese race is an enemy race," a fact that was not affected by
27. Id.atlo-11.
28. Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1395, 1413 (1999)
(book review) [hereinafter All the Themes but One].
29. ROBINSON, supra note 11, at 17-19.
30. Id. at 72.
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American birth and nationality.3 ' In his Final Report, DeWitt also
claimed that the removal of the Issei and Nisei was justified because
it was simply impossible to discern a loyal Japanese person from a
disloyal one; it was not a question of insufficient time. This
damning portion of the report was subsequently altered to
strengthen the Government's litigation position. The Government
also failed to disclose in its briefs to the Supreme Court the
existence of documents that detailed the conclusions of the Office
of Naval Intelligence, the FBI, and the Federal Communications
Commission, which all refuted DeWitt's claims
of disloyalty
and
•
32
sabotage and undermined the case for the internment.
In considering the role played by racial prejudice, it is
instructive to consider the position of Germans and Italians living
in the United States. A small number of German and Italian aliens
were interned on an individualized basis, and only after hearings
where they could attempt to establish their loyalty. There was also
no equivalent mass removal and internment of German and ItalianAmericans. This was despite the existence of the Bund, a pro-Nazi
network with a claimed membership of 200,000 GermanAmericans, despite the fact that German saboteurs had actually
landed on the Atlantic coast, and despite the fact that in the first
half of 1942 German U-Boats were regularly sinking American
shipping off the East Coast, often within sight of the shore. 3
So it was 110,000 Issei and Nisei who were deprived of their
freedom for years on the basis of an unverified-indeed
contradicted-premise that their racial loyalty would trump their
national loyalty.
It is hard to disagree with the verdict on the
internment subsequently rendered by the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians: "Executive Order 9066 was
not justified by military necessity, and the decisions which followed
from it-detention, ending detention, and ending exclusion-were
not founded upon military considerations. The broad historical
causes that shaped these decisions were ' 3 race prejudice, war
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership." 5
31.

PERSONALJUSTICE DENIED,

supranote 11, at 6.

32. Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denia, 51 UCLA L.
REV. 933, 976-78 (2004).
33. PERSONALJuSTICE DENIED, supra note 11, at 283-88; see also Frank H. Wu,
Profiling in the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of the JapaneseAmerican Internment,
CRIM.JUsT., Summer 2002, at 52, 55-56.
34. See Inferenceor Impact, supranote 2, at 114.
35. PERSONALJUSTIcE DENIED, supra note 11, at 18.
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Moving forward to the War on Terror, the calls from the
highest levels of the Bush administration warning against racial and
religious profiling were both notable and commendable. However,
the actions of immigration officials and airport screening staff did
not always live up to these lofty non-discriminatory sentiments.16
The same could be said for the Bush administration's eventual
establishment of the voluntary investigative interviews, which were
directed at men from Arab and Muslim countries, and the
administration's similarly directed special registration program.
The arrest and detention of mainly Arab and Muslim noncitizens in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 were ostensibly
justified by the fact that the non-citizens concerned had committed
various violations of immigration law. However, the Inspector
General of the Department of Justice later found that the FBI did
not take enough care to distinguish between those non-citizens
whom it suspected of links to terrorism, and those who were guilty
of no more than violating immigration law. 7 Thus, this policy was
both a form of preventive detention, and since the decision to
detain was effectively based on race, a form of racial profiling.
What of the detention of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo and
elsewhere? The Bush administration's War on Terror detainees
were detained because they were thought to be threats to American
national security, and as such, needed to be stopped from
launching further attacks on American interests. Yaser Hamdi and
Jose Padilla, for example, were thought to be threats to the United
States on the basis of acts in which they had allegedly already
engaged. Likewise, many Guantanamo detainees were considered
to be threats to the United States because they had allegedly fought
on the battlefield against American and Coalition forces.
Few would disagree with the proposition that those who were
captured while fighting on the battlefields of Afghanistan could be
legitimately detained by the United States. Likewise, few would
disagree with the proposition that those responsible for the 9/11
terrorist attacks could be legitimately detained with a view to trial.
But the Bush administration's detention policies ranged much
further and caught many whose links to terrorism were tenuous at
36.
37.

Daniels, supra note 9, at 169-70.
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF

THE INSPECTOR GEN., THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES
IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 195 (2003),

available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/03O6/full.pdf.
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best.3 The Bush administration's detention decisions turned out
in some cases to be based not only on sketchy factual evidence but
also on a very broad conception of the class of person who was a
sufficient threat tojustify detention.
However, the Bush administration's mistaken and wrongful
detention decisions in relation to some individuals in the course of
the War on Terror differ from the decision to intern the Issei and
Nisei in 1942 in one important respect. In the case of the War on
Terror detainees, there is a core of detainees whose detentions are
legitimate in the sense that they are a threat to the United States. It
is difficult to sustain the same claim in the case of the Issei and
Nisei interned en masse in 1942, given that their loyalty to the
United States had been confirmed by several different investigative
agencies and individuals, and that DeWitt's claims of collusion with
the enemy and sabotage had been comprehensively refuted.
Indeed, the approximately two thousand Japanese non-citizens that
the Government considered dangerous, along with several
hundred German and Italian non-citizens, were already in custody
prior to the internment, having been arrested by the FBI in early
December 1942 on the basis of a three-tiered compilation of
suspect enemy aliens collected before the war known as the "ABC
list.",

9

B. Scope
As noted earlier, the internment involved the removal and
detention of 110,000 Japanese living on the West Coast of the
United States, including some 70,000 American citizens. In order
to appreciate the scope and scale of the internment, it is useful to
compare the experience of Britain with internment during the
same time period.
During World War II, the British government detained
approximately 30,000 enemy aliens pursuant to the Royal
prerogative. Additionally, about 2,000 British subjects considered
security risks were detained under regulation 18B of the Defence
(General) Regulations, which authorized the Home Secretary to
order the detention of those considered risks to national security.
Those subject to such orders included individuals with ties to the
British Union of Fascists, and British Italians, particularly those with
38.

39.

See DAVID COLE &JULEs LOBEL, LEss SAFE LESS FREE 103-05 (2007).
PERSONALJUSTIcE DENIED, supra note 11, at 54-55.
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links to the Italian Fascist Party. Detainees received a small
measure of due process in the form of the right to make written
representations to the Home Secretary and also a right to an
administrative hearing before the Advisory Committee. The
Advisory Committee was supposed to inform detainees of the
grounds for their detention, and having heard from the detainees,
render non-binding advice to the Home Secretary.
In practice, the system was heavily skewed against those
detained, but this patina of due process was still more than the
interned Issei and Nisei received in the United States. Moreover,
Britain faced a tangible prospect of German invasion. Although it
had been promulgated at the beginning of the war, regulation 18B
was used sparingly until April 1940, and its use only accelerated
around mid-1940, a time when Britain's military situation was truly
dire. By this time, much of Western Europe had fallen under the
control of the Nazis; the defeated British Expeditionary Force had
recently been evacuated from France. Britain was thus separated
from occupied enemy territory by only the English Channel-a
narrow body of water in comparison to the expanse of the Pacific
Ocean that the Japanese Empire would have 40had to cross in order
to invade the West Coast of the United States.
Therefore, even though it had a more compelling case of
military necessity, the British government detained a far smaller
number of people, for shorter periods of time,4 ' and afforded them
more due process. In sum, the scope of the internment in the
United States compares poorly with that of its wartime ally.
How then does the internment compare to the Bush
administration counterterrorism policies under discussion? As far
as the numbers of people affected go, the sums are roughly
comparable, once the 8,000 men from Arab and Muslim countries
subject to the voluntary investigative interviews, and the 80,000
males (again from mainly Arab and Muslim states) subject to the
special registration program for visitors to the United States are
taken into account. 4 But even if we stipulate that these measures
are forms of invidious racial profiling-that is, that they involve
singling out certain people for greater scrutiny on the basis of their
40. A. W. Brian Simpson, Detention Without Trial in the Second World War:
Comparing the British and American Experiences, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 225, 230-46
(1988).
41. See id. at 265.
42.

See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 38, at 107.
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race or ethnicity-there is a world of difference between the
burdens being imposed here (being made to answer extra
questions at the airport, being subject to an investigative interview
or additional registration requirements, and being refused entry
onto an airplane) and the burdens imposed on the Issei and Nisei
by the internment.
In terms of the burden imposed, the position of terrorist
suspects deprived of their liberty without trial since 9/11 is more
closely analogous to the predicament of the interned Issei and
Nisei. This group includes: several hundred non-citizens rounded
up immediately after 9/11, who were held for an average of eighty
days before being cleared; the roughly 800 detainees or former
detainees at Guantanamo, some of whom have been detained for a
period longer than the duration of World War II; two American
citizens, both detained for roughly three years each; and an
uncertain number of terrorist suspects detained at the CIA's black
sites and elsewhere. Regardless of precisely what the last figure is, it
is clear that the number of people impacted by the Bush
administration's detention policies under discussion is dwarfed by
the figure of 110,000 internees.
C. Treatment
The Japanese internment imposed great hardship and
injustice upon the Issei and Nisei. But while a terrible violation of
civil liberties, it did not descend into the torture or starvation of the
internees. 43 The initial removal of the Issei and Nisei to the
assembly centers was handled by the military in a civilized and
respectful fashion. But the internees' living conditions were
austere. The assembly centers were crowded and unpleasant, with
people being housed in facilities originally meant for horses and
livestock." Living conditions at the relocation centers themselves
were also harsh. The basic facilities provided little respite from the
extremes of the local climates; food was substandard.
The
internees did not have to pay for medical care, which actually
represented an improvement in situation for some. But the
medical facilities were basic and under-resourced, leading to the
deaths of some internees from otherwise treatable illnesses. 5
43.
44.
45.

supra note 11, at 1.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 155-58.
ROBINSON,
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There were also instances of physical brutality towards internees,
such as beatings and shootings at the Tule Lake and Manzanar
46
relocation centers.
The mistreatment of detainees is perhaps the largest black
mark on the Bush administration's War on Terror. It is now well
established that many persons detained by the United States in the
course of the War on Terror were subject to treatment that was at
least cruel, inhuman or degrading, and in some cases torture.
Further, a number of detainees have died while in American
47
custody, at least some as a result of mistreatment by their captors.
In the case of the non-citizens apprehended immediately after
the 9/11 attacks, it subsequently came to light that some of those
detainees were abused, in some cases physically, by their captors.4
While there may be some doubt as to whether this was the result of
the work of a few bad apples, the same cannot be said of the Bush
administration's treatment of other War on Terror detainees. The
clearest example is the High-Value Detainee (H-VD) program,
whereby the CIA became involved in the interrogation of so-called
"high value" al Qaeda detainees thought to have critical
information about further attacks on the United States.
The first of these detainees to be captured was Abu Zubayda.
The CIA developed a set of coercive interrogation techniques
("enhanced interrogation techniques" or ElTs) and used them on
Zubayda with the knowledge and at least implicit permission of
President Bush's top advisors.
This occurred prior to the
completion of what is now known as "the torture memos," a series
of legal memoranda from the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel that purported to confer formal legal cover for the
CIA's coercive interrogations.
The CIA's program included
slamming detainees' backs into a flexible wall, sleep deprivation,
exposure to extremes of temperature, the use of bright lights and
loud sounds, and stress positions. Three detainees were also
subject to the
form of torture known as
S49 much-discussed
waterboarding.
The use of coercive interrogation techniques subsequently

All the Themes but One, supra note 28, at 1408-09.
See, e.g., HINA SHAMSI, COMMAND'S RESPONSIBILITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN
U.S. CUSTODY IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 5-19 (Deborah Pearlstein ed., 2006),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221-etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf.
48. Inference orImpac supranote 2, at 130.
49. See MAYER, supra note 20, at 139-81.
46.
47.
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spread from the CIA to the military in glaces such as Bagram,
Guantanamo, and of course Abu Ghraib.
The mistreatment of
the Guantanamo detainees, for example, occurred as military
commanders at Guantanamo Bay were pressured to obtain more
intelligence from their captives, such as suspected "20th hijacker"
Mohamed al-Qahtani.
This resulted in the use of coercive
interrogation techniques, which were authorized by Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. The coercive techniques in question
included subjecting detainees to sleep deprivation, stress positions
and exposing them to extremes of temperature.5
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that there was no attempted mass internment of Arab
or Muslim Americans in the United States after 9/11 must be
viewed as a positive. There may be several reasons for this. First,
the 9/11 attacks fortunately proved not to be the first of a string of
attacks on American soil. Second, Arab and Muslim Americans, in
contrast to the Japanese-Americans in 1941, are more
geographically spread across the United States, relatively well
educated and prosperous, and generally integrated into American
society. Third, history has rightly come to judge the internment
harshly.
Contrary to the fears expressed by Justice Jackson,
Korematsu lurks
not as a loaded weapon, but as a salutary anti5
precedent.

2

But it is important to remember how Korematsu became a legal
pariah, and how the historical consensus that now exists about the
internment came to be.
It took a redress movement, the
establishment of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, the efforts of lawyers and other individuals
to have the convictions of Fred Korematsu, Minoru Yasui, and
Gordon Hirabayashi overturned on the basis of government
misconduct, and official acts of penitence in the form of the
revoking of Executive
Order 9066 and the enactment of the Civil
53
Liberties Act.

Inherent in this is also the passage of a considerable period of
time. At present, the Bush administration is a very recent memory,

50.

51.

See ALFRED W. McCoY, A QUESTION OF TORTURE 120-50 (2006).
See MAYER, supra note 20, at 182-212.

52.
53.

Lessons of History, supra note 1, at 586.
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988).
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and fallout from some of its counterterrorism policies continues to
be felt. President Obana is still trying to close Guantanamo.
Similarly, the question of what, if anything, should be done with
those who were involved in the torture or mistreatment of terrorist
detainees is still a live issue. Perhaps at some point in the future,
scholars will be able to examine both periods with the benefit of
greater distance and hindsight. But for time being, let me state my
conclusion the best I can.
Looking at the first two points of comparison, the internment
was demonstrably worse than the aspects of the Bush
administration's War on Terror I have been discussing here,
The
namely racial profiling and detention without trial.
internment imposed greater burdens on a larger number of
people, and its benefit to American national security was at best
tenuous, if not non-existent. The only caveat here is the third
point of comparison. How much difference does the torture or
mistreatment of the Bush administration's War on Terror detainees
make? There is no clear answer to this, although I suspect most will
consider that the mistreatment and even torture of some War on
Terror detainees is not enough to offset the greater scope of the
internment and the invidious racial motivations that underlay it.
On this view then, the internment is the worse of the two
things under consideration. To be clear, this is not to say that the
Bush administration's indefinite detention of even a relatively small
number of terrorist suspects was legal or a good idea, or that racial
profiling at airports and elsewhere is either legal or advisable.
Indeed, to say that something is not as bad as the internment of the
Issei and Nisei in World War II is hardly an endorsement, and
might rightly be seen as damning with faint praise.
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